Timeline of West Virginia: Civil War and Statehood
June 14 1863

When the train of cars which arrived from the east last evening, passed Martinsburg, it was generally believed that Col. McReynolds had been attacked at Berryville, by the rebels, and was compelled to retreat. Some considerable alarm was felt about Martinsburg. All the government stores were removed on Saturday and yesterday, to Baltimore and Sandy Hook. Citizens at Oakland report that they had heard a thousand cannon discharges.

P.S. - Since the above was written, telegraphic dispatches have been received from Martinsburg announcing that a large force of rebels, under Gen. J. Atkinson, appeared before the town of Martinsburg and demanded a surrender, yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock. Gen. Tyler, commanding the post, refused, and a fight commenced at once. Telegraphic communication was cut off last evening at 7 o'clock, and nothing is known as to the result of the engagement. Gen. Tyler had a regiment of infantry and a full battery at Martinsburg, and had decided to make a determined defence.

The rebels attacked Gen. Milroy at Winchester on Saturday, and an artillery fight was going on all day. Nothing is known as to the result. General Milroy felt fully able to defend himself. We shall doubtless have further particulars to-day.

Headquarters, Maryland Heights, June 25, 1863.

Sir: Constant occupation since my arrival here on the morning of the 15th instant has heretofore prevented my reporting officially on the affair at Martinsburg, which took place on the 14th instant. I left Baltimore by special train at 12 o'clock on the night of June 13, to relieve Colonel [B. F.] Smith in the command of the Third Brigade, whose headquarters were at Martinsburg, W. Va.; and, stopping a short time to confer with Brigadier-General Kelley, in command at Harper's Ferry, I reached Martinsburg about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, and found that Colonel Smith had just received notice of the approach of the enemy, and was on the point of going out with parts of two regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and one company of cavalry, in all about 1,200 men, to meet hint, and notifying Colonel Smith of my order, informed him that under the circumstances I would not assume command, but would be on the field for advice, if necessary.

Colonel Smith formed his line of battle between 9 and 10 o'clock at about 1 mile from Martinsburg, across the Winchester pike. At this time his pickets were engaged about half a mile to the front, and, as soon as his line was formed, he sent forward some skirmishers to support his pickets, and a desultory firing continued for one hour or more when the enemy showed an increased force within artillery range, and a few shells sufficed to drive him back over the ridge and out of sight. About this time (11 o'clock), information was received that the enemy had captured a portion of General Milroy's forces at Bunker Hill, 6 to 8 miles on the Winchester pike, and having been at Winchester only two days before, and knowing General Milroy's position, the information induced the belief that Milroy had been attacked by a strong force at Winchester, and that the attack on Bunker Hill was intended to, and in fact did, cut off his retreat on Martinsburg; and, acting on this opinion, I at once ordered the baggage train belonging to Smith's brigade (ascertaining that all the stores had been previously sent off by railroad) to move at once toward Williamsport, and make its way into Pennsylvania, which was accomplished, and the train saved.

About 12 o'clock I notified Colonel Smith that we should have to retreat, but to hold on until the safety of the baggage was secured, and we would then move to Williamsport, and thence to Harper's Ferry. Between 11 and 12 o'clock, Colonel Smith, with my approbation, withdrew the command from the Winchester pike to the heights near Martinsburg on which the cemetery is located, covering a connection with the Williamsport and Shepherdstown roads, both of which branch-off in the rear of the cemetery. Here Colonel Smith held his command in hand, his skirmishers--both cavalry and infantry--being from time to time in contact with the enemy, until about 1 o'clock, when the following communication was received:

Headquarters, Camp near Martinsburg, June 14, 1863.

The Commanding Officer U. S. Forces near Martinsburg:

Sir: I herewith demand the surrender of Martinsburg. Should you refuse, you are respectfully requested to notify the inhabitants of the place to remove forthwith to a place of safety. Small-arms only will be used for one hour upon the town after your reception of this note. After that, I shall feel at liberty to shell the town, if I see proper. Should you refuse to give the necessary notification to the inhabitants, I shall be compelled to hold your command responsible.

Very truly, yours,

A. G. Jenkins,
Brigadier-General, &c.

P. S.--An immediate reply is necessary.

To the communication, Colonel Smith replied as follows:

Headquarters U. S. Forces, Martinsburg, W. Va., June 14, 1863.

A. G. Jenkins, Brigadier-General, & c.:

General: Martinsburg will not be surrendered. You may commence shelling as soon as you choose. I will, however, inform the inhabitants of your threats.

Very respectfully, yours,

B. F. Smith, Colonel, commanding U. S. Forces.

About this time a messenger arrived from Milroy, notifying, me that he had been attacked by Ewell, Imboden, and Jackson's corps on the 13th, and had been able to hold his position up to 11 o'clock on the night of the 13th. This information, coupled with the fact of the capture of Bunker Hill, satisfied me that General Milroy had been defeated, and his retreat by way of Martinsburg cut off, and that the only object in holding on was to cover the wagon train, which had moved toward Williamsport.

Up to this time I had been counting on assistance from the railroad, if deemed necessary to move the troops to Harper's Ferry, but, on applying to the agent at the station, was surprised to find that every car and engine had been sent away from the depot, and that there were neither cars nor engines in either direction that could be made available in the exigency. They had all been removed out of reach.

From 3.30 o'clock until sunset the skirmishing in front had continued at intervals, the enemy gradually massing his increasing forces in our front and on our right flank, showing a disposition about 5 o'clock to turn our right and occupy Martinsburg. These different movements were kept in check by our artillery, in the absence of any artillery on the part of the enemy, until just at sunset, when a severe fire from a couple of batteries was opened on us at convenient range, which was most gallantly replied to by Maulsby's battery, and at one time so effectually as almost to silence the rebel guns. At the opening of the enemy's battery, a battalion of the One hundred and sixth New York, Colonel James, which was supporting Maulsby's battery, was thrown into momentary confusion, and fell back, but was immediately rallied by its officers, and resumed its position in support of the battery.

It had now become apparent that the enemy was in force on our front with at least a brigade of infantry and a superior force of artillery and cavalry, and were threatening our right, and that the moment for retreat had come; and, in fact, that while I was engaged in stimulating Maulsby's battery and giving some assistance to Colonel James in rallying his regiment, Colonel Smith, with the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, had already, without any notice to me, left the field, and I discovered the One hundred and sixth New York were purposing to follow, but apparently in doubt which way to move. On leaving Maulsby's battery, I ordered him to throw in a few shots as rapidly as possible, then limber up, and follow the movements of the infantry; and seeing the One hundred and sixth New York halting, I ordered it forward, intending to move out on the Williamsport road, supposing the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio had taken that direction. Moving forward a couple of hundred yards, and before reaching the crossing of the Shepherdstown road, I saw that the enemy's cavalry had occupied Martinsburg, and cut us off from our retreat on Williamsport; and seeing nothing of Colonel Smith's regiment, I concluded to take the Shepherdstown road, and directed Colonel James to move his regiment in that direction.

At the time the rebel artillery opened fire, one section of Maulsby's battery was posted some 300 paces to the rear of the other two sections, and its fire directed against some rebel cavalry and infantry marching against our right. One gun of this section had been dismounted, and the other, with the two caissons, had been limbered up and fell in in rear of the One hundred and sixth New York, and moved off in that regiment. The other two sections, by some mistake not yet explained, moved off in a gallop up the road toward Williamsport, and when I came to the rear in search of them they had passed so far forward as to render it impossible to regain the column on the Shepherdstown road. Captain Maulsby, whose gallantry on the field could hardly have been exceeded, will be able to explain his movements and the reasons for them and the manner in which he retreated into Pennsylvania with a part of his battery.

The movement of the One hundred and sixth New York on the Shepherdstown road was followed by the cavalry, and the column, after moving a couple of miles, closed up on the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, with Colonel Smith in command, and continued to march steadily until it reached the ford, 1 1/2 miles below Shepherdstown, about 1 a. m. the 15th instant, where it crossed the river without molestation from the enemy, and arrived at Harper's Ferry about 7 a. m. of the same day.

As the enemy was in force in our front at the time the retreat commenced, and was continually moving his troops forward from Winchester, it is probable the night march contributed mainly to the saving of the command; and it is but due to the troops to say that this march, without rest or water, was conducted with perfect order, without straggling and without complaint.

The brigadier-general commanding cannot close this report without special notice of First Lieutenant Wyckoff, First New York Cavalry, who conducted the head of the column, and by his knowledge of the country and his coolness did more than any other man in the column to assure the safety of the command.

I herewith submit, and without comment, copies of the reports made by Colonels Smith and James as to their participation in the affair of the 14th at Martinsburg.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

Dan. Tyler,
Brigadier-General, &c.

Lieut. Col. Donn Piatt,
Chief of Staff, Eighth Army Corps.

. . .

Maryland Heights, June 27, 1863.

General: I have the honor to make the following report of the attack on Martinsburg, W. Va., on the 14th instant: The United States troops at Martinsburg consisted of eight companies of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. Col. William H. Harlan commanding; eight companies of the One hundred and sixth New York Volunteers, Col. E. C. James commanding; Maulsby's Independent West Virginia Battery; one company of cavalry, of the First Battalion Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, Captain Firey commanding; a small detachment from the First New York Cavalry, and a few of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

It was expected some days before that an attack would be made on the place, and I had received orders to make preparations accordingly. All the stores at the depot were loaded on the cars, and sent to Baltimore and Harper's Ferry, in anticipation of an attack by an overwhelming force. Brigadier-General Tyler, with his staff, consisting of Capt. Max Woodhull and Lieut. E. L. Tyler, had been directed by Major-General Schenck, commanding Eighth Army Corps, to proceed to Martinsburg, and make sure that proper dispositions would be made according to circumstances.

About 8 a. m. Sunday, June 14, my vedettes were driven in, and reported the enemy advancing by the Winchester turnpike in force. I immediately ordered the whole of my command to move in that direction, and take a position behind the stone fences between the Winchester and Charlestown roads, throwing out skirmishers and scouts in all directions, endeavoring to find out the strength and position of the enemy. My orders were to fall back on Harpers Ferry, if attacked by a superior force, either by the Williamsport or by the direct road. Finding that my position was one that could be easily cut off from these roads, with the approbation of General Tyler, I changed my position to the high ground near the cemetery and nearer the roads. My object was to gain time, so that I could get my brigade train well on the road to Williamsport. This I succeeded in doing by throwing an occasional shell and keeping my skirmishers well out to engage the enemy.

About noon, I received the following communication from General A. G. Jenkins, commanding rebel troops, viz:

Headquarters, &c
Camp near Martinsburg, June 14, 1863.

The Commanding Officer U. S. Forces near Martinsburg:

Sir: I herewith demand the surrender of Martinsburg. Should you refuse, you are respectfully requested to notify the inhabitants of the place to remove forthwith to a place of safety. Small-arms only will be used for one hour upon the town after your reception of this note. After that, I shall feel at liberty to shell the town, if I see proper. Should you refuse to give the necessary notification to the inhabitants, I shall be compelled to hold your command responsible.

Very truly, yours,

A. G. Jenkins,
Brigadier-General, &c.

P. S.--An immediate reply is necessary.

To this communication, I replied as follows, having first submitted it for the approval of General Tyler:

Headquarters U. S. Forces,
Martinsburg, W. Va., June 14, 1863.

A. G. Jenkins,
Brigadier-General, & c.:

General: Martinsburg will not be surrendered. You may commence shelling as soon as you choose. I will, however, inform the inhabitants of your threats.

Very respectfully, yours,

B. F. Smith,
Colonel, Commanding U. S. Forces.

Immediately after their demand, I notified the inhabitants, and they left the town in large numbers. Jenkins did not open his musketry and artillery, as he threatened, but was held in check until near sunset, when I had received notification that all my wagons had crossed the ferry at Williamsport, and I was prepared to fall back. Just as I had given orders to the pickets and skirmishers to fall back slowly and cautiously, the enemy opened upon me from three different points, their batteries having during the day obtained my range. I had ten minutes before given the order to limber up and get under arms, preparatory to falling back to the ferry, when the enemy opened with such a concentrated fire it cannot be wondered at that the men were thrown into temporary confusion. However, I brought the men off in good order, and was not followed by the enemy on the Shepherdstown road, which I took with the main portion of the command, crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown Ford, and following the towpath of the canal to Maryland Heights, where I arrived safely, and reported to General B. F. Kelley, commanding.

One section of Maulsby's battery, commanded by Lieut. John S. S. Herr, went with the main body of the command on the Shepherdstown road, but one of his pieces overturning in a gully was lost, the wheel being broken. The limber was brought away. The other two sections of the battery, under Capt. Thomas A. Maulsby, with Lieutenants Graham and Means, took the Williamsport road, and, after some resistance, the guns were captured by the enemy, and Captain Maulsby wounded in the leg, but escaped with his officers and most of his men and horses.

The detachment of the First New York Cavalry, Lieutenants Martindale and Jesse F. Wyckoff, and Captain Firey's company (B), First Battalion Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteer Cavalry, and a small number of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, rendered valuable and important service, especially when the rebel cavalry charged through the town in large numbers, our small force of cavalry contending for every inch of ground.

Company I, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, Capt. Henry C. Yontz, stationed at the block-house at Opequon Creek, was captured by the enemy, with the exception of 2 officers and 13 men. Captain Yontz, having endeavored to escape with his company by the Williamsport road, was surrounded by the enemy. The 3 medical officers of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers fell into the hands of the enemy, with a few medical stores, a small quantity of ammunition, and a few arms. No quartermaster's or commissary stores were lost. A small pile of forage was burned as we were leaving.

About 200 men of the whole command are missing, but are supposed mostly to be stragglers, as they are constantly coming in.

The number of killed and wounded is not known, but is very small. The rebels suffered more than ourselves; 7 killed, I have heard of, and quite a number wounded.

On my arrival at the Shepherdstown Ford (I had gone ahead with a small escort to examine the ford), a volley was fired upon us from the opposite bank. This turned out to be from our own pickets, who had mistaken us for the enemy, the night being very dark. No one hurt, fortunately.

The forced march to Maryland Heights from Martinsburg was long and fatiguing, but we congratulate ourselves that we held in check a whole day a vastly superior force of the enemy, leaving him an empty town, as far as supplies were concerned, when he expected to find a depot stored with everything he desired.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B.F. Smith,
Col. 126th Ohio Vol. Inf. Comdg 3d Brig., 1st Div., 8th Corps.

Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler,
Baltimore, Md

. . .

Judge-Advocate-General's Office,
Washington, D. C., September 17, 1863.

The record of a court of inquiry lately convened to investigate the facts and circumstances connected with the evacuation of Martinsburg by the command of Brig. Gen. D. Tyler, U. S. Volunteers, having been submitted to me under your indorsement of the 12th instant, has been fully reviewed, and I have the honor to report the following summary of facts, with the conclusions derived therefrom:

Up to June 13, the United States forces at Martinsburg, Va., had been for several months under the command of Col. B. F. Smith, whose detachment consisted of two regiments of infantry, eight companies each, one field battery, and rather more than a company of cavalry; in all, about 1,300 men. Martinsburg was not a fortified post.

On the 13th, a written order was issued by Major-General Schenck to Brigadier-General Tyler, by which he was required to assume command of the troops at Martinsburg, for the purpose of using them to support and cover the retreat of Major-General Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry. Details of the service are left to the discretion of General Tyler, but Bunker Hill is suggested as a suitable position at which to make a stand if the rebels be found in force between his own troops and those of Milroy. General Tyler is required to keep constantly in communication meanwhile with General Milroy. Pursuant to this order, General Tyler proceeded from Baltimore, by way of Harper's Ferry, to Martinsburg, where he arrived about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, when he found Colonel Smith just taking out his troops to meet an advance of the enemy, who were already skirmishing with his pickets.

In his official report, General Tyler says that he went to Martinsburg to relieve Colonel Smith in the command of the Third Brigade, but he states that, on arriving, he concluded not to assume the command. In his testimony he sets forth his reason for this course as follows:

First. Because the command was not commensurate with his rank, and was not equal to the expectations which he had formed of it when leaving Harper's Ferry.

Secondly. Because he was a perfect stranger to the command, and it would be "more for the good of the service for Colonel Smith to fight the battle which was already begun."

He nevertheless, as he says, notified Colonel Smith that he would give him any advice that he might require. However insufficient these reasons, especially the first, may be considered, there was received by General Tyler about noon intelligence which rendered it necessary for him to take the command, at least for the special purpose of carrying out the instructions contained in the order of General Schenck. This was the intelligence that General Milroy had been attacked by Lee's army in greatly superior force, and that Bunker Hill, situated between Martinsburg and Winchester, had been occupied by the enemy. It would have been useless, therefore, for General Tyler to have attempted with his small force to make a diversion in favor of General Milroy. Indeed, his orders from General Schenck had been predicated on the supposition that Milroy was attacked only by the usual Valley force of cavalry under Jenkins, Imboden, or Jones.

In the course of the day, however, a further communication was received from General Schenck to the effect that it was thought better by the latter that General Tyler's command should fall back to Harper's Ferry, and, if possible, afford relief to General Milroy from that point. General Tyler, however, still refrained from assuming command of Colonel Smith's troops, and the latter says in his testimony that the general at no time exhibited to him his orders or explained the reason why he had visited Martinsburg, and that he (Smith) therefore supposed that he had come as an inspector. He adds that during the day he sometimes consulted or advised with the general. General Tyler, on the other hand, says that when he informed Colonel Smith that he would not, under the circumstances, assume command, he at the same time notified him (Smith) of his order.

During the day, the enemy gradually massed his forces, but was held in check by Colonel Smith's troops, and especially by the guns of his battery, the enemy appearing to have as yet no artillery on the ground. About noon, General Jenkins, commanding the rebel force, summoned Colonel Smith to surrender, to which summons the latter refused to accede.

Early in the morning, Colonel Smith had sent off his wagon train by the Williamsport road. He had received orders, addressed to himself personally by General Kelley, his division commander, from Harper's Ferry, to fall back by this road if pressed by a much superior force. General Tyler, however, states that it was he who sent off the brigade train, and that he notified Colonel Smith to delay his retreat until the safety of the train was secured. Colonel Smith, on the other hand, says that General Tyler proposed to him to retreat early in the day, but that he (Smith) declined to do so, as he wished first to assure the escape of his wagons; that General Tyler thereupon said that he would leave the matter to Colonel Smith's judgment, at the same time declining to assume the responsibility of the retreat.

Still another instance, however, is mentioned in the testimony, in which General Tyler assumed to give an order or direction during the day. Lieutenant-Colonel Harlan, commanding the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, testifies that the general ordered him at one time to open fire upon his own skirmishers. He adds that he disobeyed this order for the reason that he had placed the skirmishers himself, and knew that they were his own men, although he could not make General Tyler believe it.

Toward evening, the enemy suddenly opened upon Colonel Smith's troops with (as it is testified) about thirty guns. Under this severe and concentrated fire, they were at first thrown into some disorder, but appear to have been soon rallied by Colonel Smith and his officers.

The Williamsport road seeming to be occupied or commanded by the enemy, orders were rapidly communicated by Colonel Smith to retreat by the Shepherdstown road, these orders being given to the commanding officers of the two infantry regiments (One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio and One hundred and sixth New York), but not, as it would appear, to Captain Maulsby, commanding the battery. Colonel Smith says that he sent his aides to direct the different commanders to take the Shepherdstown route, but does not distinctly recollect whether he sent particularly to Maulsby or not. Colonel Smith himself conducted the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio off the field, ordering the One hundred and sixth New York to follow. The latter, after moving, was halted to reform its line, which had been broken by the artillery.

At this moment, General Tyler came to the front, and assumed command of this regiment and of the battery, which was also about to leave the ground. He says that he did so because he found the One hundred and sixth Regiment alone in the field, and apparently awaiting orders, and because Colonel Smith had left and could not be found; that he (Smith) had retreated without orders from him (Tyler), leaving at the moment of the attack without returning to look after the column. Upon thus assuming command, General Tyler states that he ordered Captain Maulsby to throw half a dozen shots from each of the four of his guns, which he had directly under his command the remaining section being in another part of the field and then to limber up and follow the infantry. He then ascertained by personal observation that the Williamsport road was occupied by Jenkins, and rode back to the infantry, and ordered them to march off by the Shepherdstown route. On returning presently, as he says, to look after the artillery, he found that after firing, as directed, Captain Maulsby had moved off rapidly by the Williamsport road. The two sections with Maulsby were soon after captured on this road by the enemy's cavalry, but Captain Maulsby, with his officers and most of his men and horses, succeeded in escaping. Of the remaining section, one gun got off safely on the Shepherdstown road with the infantry; the other was disabled, and left on the field by the lieutenant commanding the section. An officer on duty with the two sections under Maulsby testifies that the guns might have been saved if the infantry supports had not moved off the field and left them. He says that these guns remained last on the field because they were detained there by General Tyler, who directed them to be used upon the advancing enemy, and then to limber up and get away, as the infantry had been gone some time. General Tyler, however, did not order or direct Captain Maulsby by which road to retreat, and the witness states that at the point where the guns were placed the officers could not see the troops moving by the Shepherdstown road.

General Tyler accompanied the One hundred and sixth Regiment from the field, and, after marching about a mile, overtook Colonel Smith and the One hundred and twenty-sixth. The general states that he then reformed the column, and conducted the retreat to the river at Shepherdstown, where the troops crossed by the ford, and continued their march on the other side down to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Smith, however, in his official report makes no mention of General Tyler having anything to do with the conduct of the retreat. It appears that this march was made in good order and with very little straggling.

The entire loss of the command during the day was 4 or 5 killed about a dozen wounded, and some 150 taken prisoners, being chiefly those who erred and took the Williamsport road.

The amount of public property lost was small. The stores, of which Martinsburg was the depot, had been removed by railroad to Harper's Ferry prior to June 14. Indeed, the principal and most unfortunate feature of the retreat was the loss of the two sections of Maulsby's battery. Captain Maulsby himself was severely wounded, and unable to attend the court as a witness, and no official report by him is filed with the proceedings.

In their conclusion, the court find that the retreat was generally properly conducted, and the public property suitably cared for; that the four guns captured were improperly kept on the field after all the supports had left, and that the gun of the remaining section, which was disabled, was improperly abandoned on the field by Lieutenant Herr. Upon the whole testimony, it is believed that the following conclusions are properly arrived at:

1. That Colonel Smith handled his command skillfully during the day (June 14), but that he withdrew from the field too abruptly, and without giving the desirable attention, or communicating with certainty, to a part of his command the final orders for the retreat.

2. That General Tyler was at fault in keeping the two sections of Maulsby's battery on the field (as is found by the court) after the infantry supports had retired, and in finally neglecting, after assuming command over the battery, to direct Captain Maulsby as to his line of retreat.

3. That Maulsby's four guns were lost principally because of this action and neglect on the part of General Tyler, and partly because of the neglect of Colonel Smith to convey a positive order to Maulsby as to the direction of the retreat.

4. That General Tyler would have more strictly complied with the instructions of his commanding officer if he had assumed command of the brigade upon his arrival at Martinsburg, in accordance with General Schenck's order of June 13, taken in connection with the communication from the latter of the 14th; that if General Tyler had so assumed command, it is probable that the errors which were committed at the time of the attack by the enemy in force, in consequence of there being practically two commanding officers in the field, might have been avoided.

Respectfully submitted.

J. Holt,
Judge-Advocate-General.

Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.

Timeline of West Virginia: Civil War and Statehood: June 1863